Race, Poverty, and Teacher Mobility by Benjamin Scafidi et al.
ANDREW YOUNG SCHOOL
 O F  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S
  
 
Race, Poverty, and Teacher Mobility 
 
Benjamin Scafidi 
Georgia College and State University 
 
 
David L. Sjoquist 
Georgia State University  
 
 
Todd R. Stinebrickner* 
University of Western Ontario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Todd R. Stinebrickner 
Dept. of Economics  
Social Science Centre 
The University of Western Ontario  
London, Ontario Canada 
N6A 5C2   
Email: trstineb@uwo.ca 
Phone: 519 661-2111 ext. 85293 
 
 2
 
Abstract 
This paper provides information about the importance of non-pecuniary school characteristics, such 
as race and poverty, on teacher turnover in Georgia.  Simple descriptive statistics indicate that new 
teachers are more likely to leave schools with lower test scores, lower income, or higher proportions 
of minorities.  A linear probability and a competing risks model of transitions out of first teaching 
jobs allow us to separate the importance of these highly correlated school characteristics.  The 
estimates imply that teachers are much more likely to exit schools with large proportions of minority 
students, and that the other univariate statistical relationships are driven to a large extent by their 
correlation with the minority variable.  Thus, while the common notion that teachers are more likely 
to leave high poverty schools is correct, it occurs because teachers are more likely to leave a 
particular type of poor school – one with a large proportion of minorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL: I2 Education. 
Keywords: teacher turnover, teacher mobility, school characteristics, minority students, working 
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I.  Introduction 
Most prior research related to the decisions of teachers has focused on the binary outcome of 
whether an individual decides to leave the teaching occupation.  The motivation for such research 
was often a concern about the supply of teachers, and much attention was paid to the relationship 
between earnings and teacher attrition.  However, teachers who remain in teaching do make 
decisions that are important for policy.  For example, given recent evidence about the importance of 
teachers, the high levels of sorting of student groups across schools, and the concern with the 
educational opportunities of students from disadvantaged backgrounds, obtaining a better 
understanding of the factors associated with movements of inexperienced teachers between schools is 
an important research topic.1  
This paper provides new information about the interrelated issues of teacher 
turnover/mobility and the importance of non-pecuniary school characteristics, such as race and 
poverty, using administrative data on Georgia teachers and on the elementary schools in which they 
teach.  Our particular interest is in documenting how attrition patterns vary across types of schools.  
As such, we examine exits from individual schools (i.e. both teaching job changes within and across 
school districts as well as various types of exits out of teaching).   
                                                 
1The importance of teachers, and in particular inexperienced teachers, in explaining differential educational 
outcomes has been demonstrated in several studies (Ferguson 1991; Ferguson and Ladd 1996; Rivkin et al. 1998; 
Sanders, Saxton, and Horn 1997; Sanders and Horn 1998; Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor 2003).   
 There is a large degree of racial segregation in public elementary schools in Georgia.  The index of 
dissimilarity for black and white students in Georgia public schools was 62.1 in the 2000-01 school year (Freeman, 
et al., 2002).  This index number implies that 62.1 percent of Georgia public elementary school students would have 
to change schools in order for there to be an equal racial makeup in all Georgia public schools.  Freeman, et al. also 
report high degrees of segregation by income class as well.  Metropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest tend to 
have the most racially segregated schools (Clotfelter, 1999). 
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To understand the relationship between non-pecuniary characteristics of schools and teacher 
decisions, examining exits from individual schools is important because we find that approximately 
63 percent of all teaching changes take place within a district.  Further, substantial variation in non-
pecuniary school characteristics exist among schools within districts; in 1995, eighty percent of the 
variation in 3rd grade test scores in the state of Georgia came from within-district variation, 41.3 
percent of the variation in the proportion of students in a school who are black came from within-
district variation, and 64.6 percent of the variation in the proportion of students in a school who are 
in poverty came from within-district variation.  
Further, when mobility is modelled at a district level it becomes difficult in empirical work to 
know what current school characteristics to “attach” to a person who is considering a district change 
if substantial variation in school characteristics exists within districts and mobility within districts is 
common.  For example, for a teacher who is currently working in a school with the most desirable 
characteristics in a district, it seems likely that the characteristics that are relevant when considering a 
district change are the characteristics in her particular school (since these are likely to be the 
characteristics that she will continue to have if she stays in the district).  However, a teacher who is 
working in a school with the least desirable characteristics in the district is not likely to base the 
decision of whether to leave the district entirely on the characteristics at her current school if she 
thinks that, in the future, she may be able to move to a school in the district which has more desirable 
characteristics.  In this case, deciding what characteristics are relevant for the decision is difficult 
from a practical standpoint.  This particular measurement difficulty is avoided when mobility is 
modelled  at  the  school   level.   Other  recent  research  that  examines  movements out of particular 
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schools includes Lankford et al. (2002) and Hanushek et al. (2004), which use data from New York 
State and Texas respectively.2   
After describing our data in Section II, our empirical investigation in Section III begins by 
examining the types of univariate tabulations that also appear in the papers by Lankford et al. (2002) 
and Hanushek et al. (2004).  We find that teachers are more likely to change schools–both within and 
across districts–if they begin their teaching careers in schools with lower student test scores, schools 
with lower income students, or schools that have higher proportions of minority students.   
A primary contribution of our work is the use of a linear probability model and a competing 
risks model that allow us to examine the relative importance of these highly correlated school 
characteristics in explaining exits out of first schools.3  We find that teachers are much more likely to 
exit schools with large proportions of minority students, and that the relationships found for student 
test scores and poverty rates in the univariate tabulations are being driven to a large extent by the fact 
that these variables are highly correlated with the proportion of minority students in a school.  More 
specifically, the results from both our linear probability model and competing risks model indicate 
that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of black students in a school increases the 
probability that a “median type” teacher will exit a particular school in a particular year by more than 
twenty percent, whereas one standard deviation changes in student test scores, poverty, or teacher 
pay lead to only small changes in the overall exit probability. 
                                                 
2In earlier work, Theobald (1990) and Mont and Rees (1996) estimated models that explain the decisions of teachers 
in Washington state and New York state, respectively, to leave their school districts.  Both of these studies combined 
attrition from teaching and moves across districts and did not consider moves within districts. Theobald and Gritz 
(1996) and Gritz and Theobald (1996) estimated models that explain the relationship between personal and school 
characteristics and the decisions of teachers in Washington state to move to a different school district, to move into 
public school administration, or to exit the state public education system. 
3In terms of approaches that are closest to that of this paper, Hanushek et al. (2004) use data on Texas elementary 
teachers and schools to estimate multinomial logit models of teacher transitions out of school districts and out of 
teaching.  Their competing risks results do not examine moves within districts.   We became aware that Hanushek et 
al. (2004) were also working on this topic after completing an earlier draft of this paper. 
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Thus, our use of these models allows us to say something very specific about the common 
suggestion that teachers are more likely to leave high poverty schools.  Our empirical work indicates 
that, while this suggestion is true, it occurs because teachers are more likely to leave a particular type 
of poor school - one that has a large proportion of minority students.  More generally, the main 
policy point of our paper is that, if one is interested in understanding mobility and attrition, it is of 
utmost importance to understand what is happening at schools with high proportions of minority 
students.    Section IV provides concluding remarks including a discussion of whether high attrition 
rates at minority schools are likely to be indicative of low quality education at these schools.  
 
II.  Data 
 To analyze the mobility and retention of new elementary school teachers, we merged three 
sources of data on all public elementary schools teachers and all public elementary schools in 
Georgia.4  Data on the characteristics of individual teachers from the 1991-92 school year to the 
2000-01 school year were obtained from the administrative records kept by the Georgia Professional 
Standards Commission (GAPSC).  Characteristics of individual elementary schools from 1994-95 to 
2000-2001, including racial composition, average student achievement on standardized exams, and 
percentage of students eligible for free or reduced lunch were provided by the Georgia Department of  
                                                 
4Georgia is in many ways roughly an “average” state.  Georgia’s median household income in 1999 was about 
$39,500, ranking 26th in the U.S.  Women working in Georgia earned $934 more than the national median for 
women.  Georgia students in the 3rd, 5th, and 8th grades scored very close to or at the national average on the battery 
of Stanford 9 exams administered in 2001 (Georgia Department of Education, 2002).  Almost 83 percent of Georgia 
residents have at least a high school diploma, compared to 84 percent nationwide.  According to the National 
Education Association, teacher salaries in Georgia are slightly below the national average, the highest in the 
southeast, and 17th highest in the nation (Salzer, 2001).  The rate of adults over age 25 with at least a college degree 
is lower in Georgia relative to the nation–23.1 percent in Georgia and 25.6 percent overall.  Georgia differs from the 
rest of the nation with respect to homeownership and racial composition as well.  In 1999, 71.3 percent of Georgians 
owned their homes compared to a rate of 66.8 percent nationally.  Nationally, 30.9 percent of individuals are 
nonwhite or of mixed race, compared to 37.4 percent of Georgians.  Unless otherwise noted, all information in this 
footnote comes from the U.S. Department of the Census web site, www.census.gov. 
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Education (GADOE).  Actual quarterly wages paid to the teachers and former teachers comes from 
administrative payroll records from the state unemployment insurance (UI) system maintained by the 
Georgia Department of Labor (GADOL).  These data are referred to as ES202 data.5  Virtually all 
employees are subject to the UI tax, and thus virtually all wages in non-teaching occupations are 
observed. The ES202 data identify the industry (4-digit SIC code), but not the occupation of each 
individual.6   
Merging these three sources of data allows us to differentiate between the reasons that a 
teacher may leave his/her first teaching job.   If an individual is no longer working as a full-time 
teacher, but receives wages from a public school district, we classify him/her as working in “other 
education sector employment.”  If a former teacher does not have a wage in the ES202 file, then 
he/she is either living in Georgia but not working, living in another state and not working, living in 
another state and working as a teacher, or living in another state and working in a non-teaching 
occupation.  The data do not allow us to differentiate between these possibilities so we group them 
together in a “leaving the Georgia workforce” category.  Note that we also classify individuals who 
                                                 
5The ES202 data are described in detail by White and Geddes. (1990). All employers covered in the unemployment 
insurance system report each employee’s wages to the GADOL on a quarterly basis.  The ES202 data identify the 
industry (4-digit SIC code), but not the occupation of each individual.  Using ES202, the actual wages paid to 
teachers and former teachers were matched with the teacher records in the GAPSC files by social security number.  
For individuals listed in the GAPSC files as teachers for a given year, the match of wages to teachers was almost 
perfect–of the roughly 820,000 teacher records over the 10-year period, only 7 records could not be matched to 
wage information in the ES202 data files. 
6Each record in the GAPSC data contains a job code, which is used to determine which individuals are teaching.  
Nevertheless, a large number of these teachers have low actual wages as reported by ES202.  Perhaps these teachers 
were working for only part of the academic year.  Since we do not know why these individuals are not earning a 
full-time annual teaching wage, we did not want to characterize their wage necessarily as their observed annual 
wage.  Teaching wages are observed quarterly in the ES202 data: January-March, April-June, July-September, and 
October-December.  Georgia teachers are paid on 12-month contracts.  Since the quarterly data do not match the 
school year, care had to be taken in constructing annual teaching wages.  In the 3rd quarter of the calendar year, the 
ES202 data will contain wages for teachers from two different academic years.  To avoid this issue and the issue of 
teachers leaving in the middle of an academic year, we took the highest quarterly teaching wage from the other three 
quarters and annualized that figure.  Teachers making decisions on whether to leave the profession surely consider 
the wage they would be paid for the entire academic year as the wage offered in teaching. One drawback of using 
actual wage information is that some variation in wages is true differences in wages across districts, while some 
variation is due to differences in educational attainment.  In our data, just over 90 percent of the sample of new 
teachers never earned more than a bachelor’s degree during the same period.  We also conducted our analyses with 
only these teachers and obtained very similar results to those reported in this paper.  
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earn less than $10,000 in annual wages as having left the Georgia workforce.  Individuals who earn 
wages outside the Georgia public education sector are labelled as working in the “non-education 
sector.”  Finally, the data allow us to identify the particular school and school district in which the 
teacher is employed so we are able to differentiate between exits to a new school within the district 
and to a new school in another district.  
 We study the seven years between the 1994-95 academic year and the 2000-01 academic 
year.  Our sample contains 11,070 elementary teachers who began teaching between 1994-95 and 
1999-00 in Georgia and were under the age of 27 when they began their teaching career.7   
 Variable definitions and summary statistics of the characteristics of teachers and their schools 
are listed in Table 1.  We report summary statistics from the first year of each first teaching job.  As 
shown in Table 1, individuals on average work in schools in which 0.464 of students live in poverty 
(POVERTY), i.e. eligible for free or reduced price lunch, and 0.388 of students are black 
(PBLACK). The mean percentile rank on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (TEST) at teachers’ first 
schools is 53.28.8  Our sample of new teachers is overwhelmingly female (87.5 percent), and only 
16.7 percent of teachers identify themselves as non-Hispanic blacks (BLACK).9  Mean wages in the 
first year of teaching are approximately $30,000, in constant year 2000 dollars. 
Table 2 contains the number of teachers in each of the transition categories under study.  For 
the six annual cohorts in the data, we observe a minimum of one, a maximum of 6, and an average of 
3.46 yearly decisions before the end of the sample period, which takes place in 2000-2001 school 
year.  Defining a teaching job to be employment at a particular school, a teacher is defined to make a 
                                                 
7Limiting our sample to teachers aged 27 or younger, essentially ensures that our new teachers have not previously 
taught in Georgia.  We cannot rule out the possibility that some of these teachers may have taught in other states 
before arriving in Georgia.  However, the results in the paper are robust to reducing the cutoff age which removes 
teachers most likely to have taught elsewhere.  Evidence in Rivkin et al. (1998) that teachers gain valuable 
experience during early years of teaching is one motivation for studying new teachers. 
8For an individual elementary school, this test score is the mean of the 3rd grade Reading and Math exams. 
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transition when he/she leaves his/her first teaching job.  Of the 11,070 new teachers in our sample, 
4,222 (38 percent) remain at the same school through the end of the sample period, and thus have a 
censored spell.  However, Table 2 indicates that a large proportion of new teachers end their first 
teaching spell by changing schools.  During the sample period, 20.9 percent of all teachers end their 
first teaching job by moving to a new school in the same school district and 12.4 percent of all 
teachers end their first teaching job by moving to a teaching position in another school district.   
To provide information about yearly transition rates, we aggregate over all person-years in 
the first teaching jobs of all individuals in our sample.  We find that a person makes the decision to 
remain in his/her first school (i.e., does not leave his/her first teaching job) in 0.714 of these person-
years.  The yearly proportions associated with other transitions are as follows: accepting a new 
teaching job in the same school district (0.094); accepting a new teaching job in a different school 
district (0.052); accepting an administrative or other non-teaching job in the education sector (0.043); 
accepting a non-education sector job (0.016); and exiting the Georgia workforce entirely (0.082).10  
 
III.   The Role of School Characteristics in Teacher Mobility and Retention 
In this section, we analyze the role of school characteristics on teacher mobility and retention.  
In Section III.1, we use univariate tabulations to examine whether school characteristics in first jobs 
are different for those who exit these first jobs and those that do not exit these first jobs.  In Section 
III.2, we present results from a linear probability model and results from a competing risks model 
that allow us to examine the relative importance of school characteristics in explaining exits from 
                                                                                                                                                             
9We use PBLACK to represent the proportion of students in a school that are black and we use BLACK to indicate 
whether a particular teacher is black.  The proportion of the sample that is not non-Hispanic black or white is very 
small–less than 2 percent. 
10The small proportion associated with accepting a non-education job in Georgia is consistent with Stinebrickner 
(2001) and Stinebrickner (2002) who found that women who leave teaching often leave the workforce altogether for 
reasons related to marriage and fertility.  An examination of what teachers do when they leave teaching is the focus 
of Scafidi et al. (2002). 
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first teaching jobs.  Finally in Section III.3, we show how school characteristics change for teachers 
who move between schools. 
 
III.1 Univariate Analysis of Teacher Turnover 
A teacher’s decision to leave his/her first teaching job may depend on both wages and non-
pecuniary characteristics of schools.11  In this subsection, we examine whether teachers who remain 
in their first teaching job have, on average, different school characteristics than those who leave their 
first teaching job for each of the possible exit activities that we described above and for all of the exit 
activities aggregated. Specifically, using all person-years in the first teaching jobs of all individuals 
in our sample, Table 3 shows the average school characteristics at time t for those who remained in 
the first teaching job at time t+1 (column 1), those who accepted a new teaching job in the same 
school district at time t+1 (column 2), those who accepted a new teaching job in a different school 
district at time t+1 (column 3), those who accepted an administrative or other non-teaching job in the 
education sector at time t+1 (column 4), those who accepted a non-education sector job at time t+1 
(column), those who exited the Georgia workforce entirely at time t+1 (column 6), and those who 
exited for any of the activities in columns 2-6 (column 7).12  
                                                 
11Mandated by state law and updated annually, Georgia public schools districts face a minimum salary schedule that 
lists the minimum teacher salary that must be paid based on teacher certification status, experience, and education. 
Variation in salary arises because local school districts may pay teachers a local supplement to the salary schedule, 
and many do so.  The standard deviation of salary for new teachers with no more than a bachelor’s degree in 1994-
95 was about $3,500.  Unlike parts of the U.S., there is no collective bargaining between teacher unions and local 
school districts.  
12The total number of years contributed by a particular person is the total number of years that he remained in his 
first teaching job.  For example, if a person chose to remain in her first teaching job at the end of the first three years 
of teaching and then changed to a new teaching job in the same district after the fourth year, then the school 
characteristics in each of the first three years would contribute to the average associated with remaining in the first 
teaching job and the school characteristics in the fourth year would contribute to the average associated with 
changing to a new teaching job in the same district.   An alternative descriptive approach that would produce 
substantially bigger differences in average school characteristics would be to have school characteristics contribute 
to the average associated with remaining in the first teaching job only if the person never leaves the first teaching 
job during the sample period.  We choose our approach because it is most analogous to the empirical work in the 
remainder of the paper. 
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With respect to changing teaching jobs, the first three entries in the first row of Table 3 show 
that  wages  of teachers at time t do not differ substantially between teachers who remain at their first 
teaching job at time t+1 and teachers who change teaching jobs at time t+1.  By contrast, the first 
three entries of the fourth row of Table 3 show that the racial composition of schools (PBLACK) at 
time t does differ significantly between teachers who remain at their first teaching job at time t+1 and 
teachers who change teaching jobs at time t+1.  Teachers who remain at their first school at time t+1 
served a student population at time t that was on average 0.372 black.  Teachers who move to other 
schools within the same district at time t+1 served a student population at time t that was on average 
0.393 black, while teachers who change districts at time t+1 served a student population at time t that 
was on average 0.466 black.  A similar pattern exists for both the poverty status of students 
(POVERTY) and the achievement test score (TEST).  Teachers who move to other schools at time 
t+1 taught in schools at time t that had higher poverty rates and lower test scores than teachers who 
did not move to other schools, with larger differences for teachers who change school districts than 
for teachers who change schools within a district. 
With respect to leaving teaching for other education jobs, Table 3 indicates that teachers who 
accept administrative or other non-teaching education jobs at time t+1 had lower wages and were in 
schools with lower test scores, higher poverty rates, and higher proportions of minority students at 
time t than teachers who remain in their same teaching job at time t+1. With respect to leaving 
education jobs altogether, Table 3 indicates that teachers who leave teaching for a non-education 
sector job or leave the Georgia workforce altogether at time t+1 were, on average, in schools with 
higher proportions of black students at time t than teachers who remain in their same teaching job at 
time t+1.  By and large, there are no differences in the means of other school characteristics at time t 
for those teachers who remain in their same teaching jobs at time t+1 and those who left teaching for 
non-education jobs or left the Georgia workforce entirely at time t+1. 
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The last column of Table 3 shows the school characteristics aggregated over all of the exit 
activities in columns (2)-(6).  The results show that teachers who leave teaching (for any of the exit 
activities) in time t+1 had significantly lower wages and were in schools with lower test scores, 
higher poverty rates, and higher proportions of minority students at time t than teachers who remain 
in their same teaching job at time t+1.  Tests of the null hypotheses that the means are the same for 
those who exit and those who do not exit are rejected at traditional levels for each of the four school 
characteristics at traditional values with t-statistics of !2.34, !11.62, 2.71, and 9.040 for WAGE, 
TEST, POVERTY, and PBLACK respectively.  
 
III.2 A Linear Probability and Competing Risks Analysis of Teacher Mobility and 
Retention 
 
The analysis in the previous section indicates that teachers who leave their first schools for 
new teaching jobs were more likely to serve minority, disadvantaged, and lower achieving students 
in the year prior to exiting than teachers who did not leave their first teaching jobs and that this 
finding is driven to a large extent by those who left their first teaching jobs for other teaching jobs.  
These three non-pecuniary school characteristics are highly correlated.  The correlation between 
PBLACK and POVERTY is 0.74.  The correlation between PBLACK and TEST is -0.54, and the 
correlation between POVERTY and TEST is -0.62.  In contrast, teaching wages are not highly 
correlated with student test scores, student poverty rates, or student racial composition (the 
correlations are 0.09, -0.07, and 0.04, respectively).  
The reality that these school characteristics are highly correlated combined with the policy 
significance of determining the relative importance of the various characteristics in explaining 
teacher exits motivates our estimation of two econometric models.  We first estimate a linear 
probability model that does not distinguish between different possible exit activities.  This model has 
the virtues of being easy to interpret and not relying on any functional form assumptions.  We then 
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estimate a competing risks model that provides information about the relationship between 
characteristics and each of the different possible exit activities that was examined in Table 3. 
 
A Linear Probability Model  
Using all person-years in the first teaching jobs of all individuals in our sample, we estimate 
a linear probability model of the form: 
(1) Exitit="Xit+B(t)+uit 
The dependent variable Exitit is equal to one if a person leaves his first teaching job after year t for 
any of the activities in columns (2)-(6) of Table 3 and is equal to zero otherwise.  Xit is the vector of 
observable personal and school characteristics of teacher i at time t and are described in Table 1.  B(t) 
is a function which determines the relationship between the dependent exit variable and the number 
of years, t, that a person has been in her first teaching spell.  We assume a non-parametric form:  
(2) B (t) = * 1I(t=1)+ *2I(t=2) + * 3I(t=3)+...+* 6I(t=6)  
where I is an indicator function that is equal to one if its argument is true.  The number of terms in 
equation (2) comes from the fact that a maximum number of six decision years can be observed for 
teacher i.13  uit represents unobserved characteristics of teachers, school, and communities that 
influence the exit decision. 
The results from this specification are shown in Table 4.  Most striking in Table 4 are the 
results associated with the proportion of students in a school that are black, PBLACK.  The point 
estimate, 0.188, is both quantitatively and statistically large.  With respect to the former, the point 
estimate taken together with the standard deviation of PBLACK from Table 1 implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in PBLACK raises the probability that a (non-black) teacher will leave 
his/her first teaching in a particular year by approximately 0.06, or about twenty-one percent of the 
                                                 
13The first teaching year is 1994-95.  The last year of our sample is 2000-01. 
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annual exit rate from teaching (0.286) that was described at the end of Section II.  With respect to the 
latter, a test of the null hypothesis that PBLACK has no effect on exits from first teaching jobs is 
overwhelmingly rejected with a t-statistic of more than twelve.14  The interaction of PBLACK with 
the indicator of whether a teacher is black (BLACK) indicates that black teachers are significantly 
less likely to leave minority schools than are white teachers. 
Thus, the multivariate results for PBLACK are consistent with the difference-in-means test 
from the univariate tabulations described in the last paragraph of Section III.1 which produced a t-
statistic of more than nine.   Also similar in spirit to the univariate results from Table 3 is the estimate 
associated with the teaching wage.  A test of the null hypothesis that LOGWAGE has no effect on 
mobility yields a t-statistic of -2.65 in Table 4 which is similar to the level of significance from the 
difference-in-means test described in the last paragraph of Section III.1 for the univariate tabulations.  
Not surprising given the difference in the level of significance between the PBLACK and the 
LOGWAGE variable, the latter is found to have a much smaller quantitative effect than the former 
with a one standard deviation increase in LOGWAGE decreasing the annual exit rate out of the first 
teaching job by less than 0.01. 
Unlike the findings for PBLACK and LOGWAGE, the results associated with TEST and 
POVERTY highlight the importance of the multivariate model.  For example, with respect to the 
former variable, the difference-in-means test associated from the univariate tabulations produced a t-
statistic of !11.62 in Table 3.  However, the t-statistic associated with TEST falls to approximately 
!1.62 in Table 4.  With respect to POVERTY, the difference-in-means test from Section III.1 
suggested that higher poverty was related to higher mobility (with a t-statistic of 2.71), but the results 
in Table 4 indicate that this is not the case after conditioning on other school characteristics.  In fact, 
                                                 
14We found little difference in our results when we estimated the model separately by sex.  For example, the 
estimated effect (std. error) of PBLACK was 0.189 (0.016) when the model was estimated separately for women and 
was 0.172 (0.044) when the model was estimated separately for men. 
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the results in Table 4 indicate that, after controlling for the other variables, higher poverty is related 
to lower mobility. 
Intuitively, the difference between the univariate and multivariate results for the TEST and 
POVERTY variables arises primarily because these variables are strongly correlated with the 
PBLACK variable, which plays a very important role in the mobility decision and with each other.  
To confirm that this is the case, we estimated two additional specifications.  In one alternative 
specification we excluded the POVERTY and PBLACK variables and found that the estimated 
coefficient on TEST was -0.002 with a t-statistic of -8.05 that is much more consistent with what was 
found in the univariate analysis.  In a second alternative specification we excluded the TEST and 
PBLACK variables and found that, consistent with the univariate results, the point estimate 
associated with POVERTY indicates that higher poverty is related to significantly higher mobility.  
As expected, we also found that removing the TEST and POVERTY variables had virtually no effect 
on the estimated effect of PBLACK. 
Credibly estimating the causal impact of school characteristics in our data and also in the 
data used by others in the teacher mobility/attrition literature is extremely difficult.  One reason that  
uit in equation (1) may be correlated with observed school characteristics is that observed school 
characteristics may be related to other important characteristics of schools that are unobserved.  
Another reason that uit may be correlated with observed school characteristics is that variation in 
school characteristics across teachers is generated by the decisions of teachers and districts and these 
decisions depend, at least in part, on unobserved preferences and quality of teachers. As such, in our 
opinion, our results and the results in each of the other studies in this literature are best viewed as 
being primarily “descriptive” in nature with a primary capability of providing policymakers with 
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information about what types of schools have the highest turnover rates.15, 16 In this vein, we believe 
that this paper makes an important contribution by providing new information about specific 
perceptions that are common in policy discussion.  As one prominent example, driven largely by a 
belief that high attrition rates at schools are indicative of lower quality education, there has been 
substantial reference to a perception that teachers are much more likely to leave high poverty 
schools.  Our results indicate that, while this perception is correct, it occurs because teachers are 
more likely to leave a particular type of poor school - one that has a large proportion of minority 
students.  More generally, the main policy point from the linear probability model is very direct - if a 
policymaker is interested in understanding retention and attrition issues, then it is of importance to 
gain a better understanding of what is happening at schools with high minority rates.17 
As mentioned earlier, the other work that is most similar to our approach is Hanushek et al. 
(2004) who primarily examine exits out of school districts rather than exits out of particular schools.  
Most comparable to our results in Table 4 are the Hanushek et al. (2004) results for a linear 
probability model that examines exits for teachers who are in their first three years of teaching.18  
Consistent with our results, the percentage of students that are black is the most important of the 
                                                 
15This is not to suggest that understanding the causal impact of characteristics is not of importance.  Indeed, it is our 
opinion that future work that could explore issues related to causality and correlation in this context would be 
extremely valuable. 
16 Given our interest in providing information about this particular descriptive relationship, we did not pursue certain 
other specifications such as those that include school district Fixed Effects (FE).  In many contexts, it has been 
suggested that FE specifications are useful for getting “closer” than OLS to a causal relationship.  However, in this 
context, it is certainly not clear that this would be the case.  Indeed, if teachers tend to work in school districts where 
they lived when young, then the across-district variation in school characteristics (that is removed by FE) may be 
less susceptible to endogeneity problems than the within-district variation (that is used by the FE estimator for 
identification) since the latter is generated by decisions of teachers and school districts during the initial school 
matching process. While the relationship identified by a FE specification could certainly be interpreted in a 
descriptive manner, it is not the descriptive relationship that we are primarily interested in.   
17We also examined modifications to our specification that might help provide additional information about what 
types of schools teachers are most likely to leave.  For example, in order to examine whether the high rate of exits 
from minority schools is related to the fact that these schools are more likely to be in cities, we estimated a model 
that included an urban indicator variable.  We found that this inclusion had very little effect on the estimated effect 
of PBLACK with the t-statistic (coefficient) on PBLACK found to be 0.184 (11.648).  The general message that the 
minority status of a school is extremely important and that other characteristics play a much smaller role was found 
to be very robust across additional specifications that included additional information (e.g., unemployment rates) 
about the communities in which individuals live. 
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variables in their regression both statistically and economically (with a t-statistic of over seven and a 
point estimate of approximately two-thirds of what we find).  Also consistent with our results, they 
find that, conditional on other variables of the type we have also included, schools with higher 
percentages of students that are eligible for free and reduced lunch do not have higher attrition rates 
and that a student test score variable is statistically significant but at a much lower level of 
significance than the black variable.19  In short, the general message from their paper and this one is 
strikingly similar. 
 
A Competing Risks Model 
In this subsection, we analyse the impact of salary and school characteristics on each of the 
various transitions made by teachers.  Unlike the linear probability model used in the previous 
subsection, the competing risks hazard model used here makes distinctions between various possible 
reasons that a person may leave his/her first teaching job.  Specifically, the model distinguishes 
between remaining in the same school (F) and exiting to a teaching job in another school within the 
same district (W), exiting to a teaching job in another district (D), exiting to a non-teaching job (other 
than full-time teaching) within the Georgia public education system (E), exiting to another job 
outside the Georgia public education system (N), and exiting out of the Georgia workforce altogether 
(O).20 While the empirical model described in the previous subsection is useful for analyzing overall 
teacher turnover, it is useful to know something about the relationship between salary, school 
characteristics, and these individual transitions.  
                                                                                                                                                             
18See the first column of Table 7 in Hanushek et al. (2004). 
19When the linear model is estimated using teachers with 3-5 years of experience Hanushek et al. (2004) find a 
significant effect of POVERTY, but as in our case the effect indicates teachers are less likely to leave high poverty 
schools after conditioning on other characteristics.  The t-statistic associated with the test score variable is 2.69 in 
their work and 1.62 in our Table 4. 
20An alternative would be to specify a continuous time competing risks model and to compute likelihood 
contributions on the basis of the interval in which a person left his/her first teaching job.  This is the approach taken 
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The model is estimated by maximum likelihood.  Define jitP  to be the probability that at the 
end  of  his/her  tth  year in teaching, teacher i chooses activity j, j=F,W,D,E,N,O, for time t+1.  There  
are two cases to consider.  First, suppose a person’s spell in teaching at his/her first job is censored 
after S years in teaching.  In this case, the likelihood contribution for teacher i is the probability that 
at the end of years 1,2,...,S-1, the person decides to return to teaching at the first school for the next 
year: 
(3) .... 121
F
iS
F
i
F
ii PPPL −•••=  
The likelihood contribution is similar in the alternative case where the person is not censored.  
Suppose a person teaches for S years in his first teaching job and then leaves teaching at the first 
school for option k0{W,D,E,N,O}. In this case, the likelihood contribution for the person is the joint 
probability that at the end of years 1, 2,...,S-1, the person decides to return to teaching for the next 
year and decides at the end of year S to have activity state k in time S+1: 
(4) kiS
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We define jitP  to have a multinomial logit form: 
(5) 
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where Xit is the vector of observable personal and school characteristics of teacher i at time t and are 
described in Table 1.  B j(t) is a function which is used to determine how the probability of choosing a 
particular option j changes with the number of years, t, that a person has been in her teaching spell.  
We assume the same non-parametric form that we used in the linear probability model: 
(6) B j(t) = * j1I(t=1)+ * j2I(t=2) + * j3I(t=3)+...+* j6I(t=6) . 
                                                                                                                                                             
by Dolton and van der Klaauw (1999) and Stinebrickner (2002). Some preliminary experimentation indicated that 
our results are not sensitive to our choice of a continuous time or a discrete time model. 
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The likelihood function for the sample is given by .∏
i
iL
21  The coefficient vector $ F and the 
coefficients   in $ F(t)   are   normalized   to   zero    so   that   the   remaining   coefficient  vectors $ j, 
j=W,D,E,N,O  and  the  parameters  of $ j(t), j=W,D,E,N,O are the effects relative to the option of 
remaining in the first teaching job.  
The estimation results from the competing risks model are shown in Table 5.  There is a 
small amount of evidence in Table 5 that wages impact teacher exits from their first teaching job. In 
particular, we find no evidence of a relationship between teaching wages and exits to occupations 
outside of the public education sector or exits out of the Georgia workforce and generally only weak 
evidence of a relationship between teaching wages and other types of exits.22   
While wages are the characteristic that has been most often studied in the past, what is by far 
the most striking in Table 5 is the effect of student racial composition.  A motivation for employing 
the competing risks model is that it allows us to examine whether the strong relationship between 
PBLACK and teacher exits that is observed in the linear probability model is driven primarily by 
substantial increases in the exit probabilities associated with a small number of the exit activities.  
While there are some differences in statistical significance by exit activity, the results strongly 
suggest that this is not the case.   Relative to remaining in the same school, teachers in schools with 
higher proportions of black students (PBLACK) are significantly more likely to change teaching jobs 
within the same district, to change teaching jobs by moving to new districts, to leave teaching for 
non-education jobs, and to leave the Georgia workforce altogether.  The t-statistics associated with 
these effects are 3.15, 9.31, 6.49, and 10.72 respectively.23  The interaction of PBLACK with the 
                                                 
21In this specification, conditional on the observable characteristics, the year specific likelihood contributions are 
independent. 
22There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between teaching wages and exits to other education 
jobs (t-statistic of -4.56).  However, as shown in Table 2, relatively few teachers (7.3 percent) make this transition.  
In addition, tests of the null hypotheses that teaching wages have no effect on exits to new schools in the same 
district and exits to new schools in new districts respectively can be rejected, but only at significance levels greater 
than approximately .11.   
23 There are a variety of ways that policymakers may find the competing risks analysis, which disaggregates the 
single exit category used in the linear probability model, to be useful.   For example, if it had been observed that 
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indicator of whether a teacher is black (BLACK) indicates that black teachers are significantly less 
likely to leave minority schools than are white teachers.   
Table 5 also reveals that POVERTY has an insignificant effect on transitions to both types of 
new teaching jobs and that the TEST variable has estimated effect t-statistics of -1.51 and -1.81 in the 
equations  related  to  movements  to  a  new  school  in  the  same  district and a new school in a new 
district respectively.24  Thus, the results suggest that the univariate relationships between teacher job 
changes and the POVERTY and TEST variables that were found in Section III.1 are to a large extent 
driven by their correlation with the other school characteristics in the model, most notably the racial 
makeup of schools.  As in the linear probability model, we confirmed this using two additional 
specifications.  In one alternative specification we excluded the TEST and PBLACK variables and 
found that the estimated coefficient on POVERTY was 1.201 (t-statistic of 11.04) in the change 
districts transition and 0.353 (t-statistic of 4.14) in the new school/same district transition.  In a 
second alternative specification we excluded the POVERTY and PBLACK variables and found that 
the estimated coefficient on TEST was -0.017 (t-statistic of -8.97) in the change districts transition 
and -0.004 (t-statistic of -3.07) in the new school/same district transition.  
In order to quantify the importance of the various school characteristics, we use our estimates 
in Table 5 to compute the first-year exit probability associated with each of the exit reasons for a 
                                                                                                                                                             
PBLACK was related to only exits out of teaching altogether, one possible interpretation would have been that an 
initial teaching assignment in a particular type of school tends to influence how teachers view teaching more 
generally.  However, the fact that many teachers who start in schools with large proportions of black students 
change schools rather than exiting teaching altogether suggests that this is not necessarily the case.  Indeed, the fact 
that teachers in these schools have opportunities to move to other types of schools raises the possibility that many 
teachers may know in advance that their stays in these types of schools may be relatively short.  That is, it is 
possible that a teacher may initially accept a job in particular type of school just to “get her foot in the door.”  While 
understanding the process by which people decide whether to initially enter teaching (or whether to accept certain 
types of initial teaching jobs) is an important research topic, our data is not well-suited for examining this issue. 
24POVERTY is found to have a positive effect on transitions to other education sector jobs (t-statistic of 2.21), and, 
curiously we find a negative and statistically significant effect of POVERTY on transitions to non-education sector 
jobs and out of the Georgia workforce. This result is consistent with the findings in Hanushek et al. (2004) and 
Clotfelter et al. (2002).  Both studies find that the percent of students in poverty has a negative effect on exits from 
teaching.  In earlier work, Scafidi, et al. (2002) find that adding measures of local labor market conditions (county 
and region unemployment rate and earnings, and region dummy variables) as explanatory variables does not have 
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“baseline” person at a “baseline school” and then compare these probabilities to those obtained after 
changing the values of the school characteristics one at a time.25  As shown in Table 6, for the 
baseline person the sum of the first-year exit probabilities associated with the five possible transition 
risks is 29.7 percent.  Increasing wages by one standard deviation ($4,674) decreases the predicted 
probability of leaving the first job in the first year by only one percentage point.  Increasing test 
scores at the baseline school by one standard deviation (14.69 points) decreases the probability of 
leaving the first job in the first year by only one-half of one percentage point.  Increasing the school’s 
poverty rate by one standard deviation (0.27) decreases the probability of leaving the current school 
by about eight-tenths of a percentage point.  Thus, although there are statistically significant impacts 
of student test scores, poverty rates, and wages on a small number of teacher transitions, the overall 
impacts of these school characteristics on teacher mobility and retention are quite small.  By contrast, 
increasing the proportion of black students by one standard deviation (0.32) increases the probability 
of leaving the first job in the first year by 6.5 percentage points.  This 22 percent increase is 
consistent with what was found using the linear probability model. 
 
III.3 Changes in School Characteristics Associated with Changing Schools 
The analyses in the previous section suggest that teachers who serve higher proportions of 
minority students are more likely to leave their first teaching job – by moving to new schools within 
their districts, by moving to new districts, and by taking jobs outside of the public education sector.  
Although this analysis utilizes only the school characteristics in a teacher’s first teaching job, it 
suggests that we should perhaps expect that the schools to which teachers move will be substantially 
different than the schools that they leave.  In this section, we examine this issue by computing the 
                                                                                                                                                             
much of an impact on the magnitude or significance of the impact of wages or school characteristics on teacher 
transitions. 
25The baseline person is a non-black female teacher with all other explanatory variables set to the sample means. 
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changes in wages and school characteristics that are experienced by teachers who move to new 
schools.  These results are displayed separately in Table 7 for teachers who change schools within the 
same district (column 1) and teachers who change districts (column 2). 
Given annual changes in salary, our data indicate that teachers who remained in their first 
teaching jobs received an annual wage increase of approximately $1,820 during the sample period. 
Thus, Table 7 shows that the wage increases experienced by teachers who changed teaching jobs are 
not substantially higher (less than 1 percent) than the increases experienced by teachers who did not 
change jobs. However, consistent with what we might expect given our previous findings, Table 7 
indicates that teachers who changed schools did experience changes in non-pecuniary school 
characteristics. Teachers who moved to new schools within their first school district experienced an 
average increase in TEST of 3.37 points and average decreases in POVERTY and PBLACK of 5.4 
and 3.9 percentage points, respectively.26   Teachers who moved to new schools in different districts 
experienced an average increase in TEST of 8.0 points and average decreases in POVERTY and 
PBLACK of 11.7 and 13.3 percentage points, respectively.  
The changes in school characteristics for movers in the present study are consistent with the 
univariate analysis in Lankford, et al. (2002), which reports that New York State teachers tend to 
move away from disadvantaged students in a similar fashion.  These changes for movers are also 
broadly consistent with evidence from the California class size reduction that began in the mid 
1990s.  The sudden and large decrease in class sizes mandated by the state of California created new 
teacher positions in virtually every school in the state.  As reported in Reichardt (2000) and Betts, et 
al. (2000), incumbent teachers who served lower achieving, minority, and low-income students were 
more likely to transfer to schools that had less of these types of students.   
  
                                                 
26Test scores are recorded only for teachers who move to another elementary school.  A handful moved to middle or 
high schools. 
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V.  Conclusion 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide new information about the types of schools 
where turnover is the highest.  We find strong evidence that students with large percentages of black 
students have much higher attrition rates than other types of schools.  While there are many reasons 
to think that such results would vary to some extent based on the demographic nature and educational 
systems of different states, the message from our work is remarkably similar to that of Hanusek et al. 
(2004) who study teachers in the state of Texas. 
There are many reasons that policymakers may find it useful to have a better understanding 
of the attrition rates at various types of schools.  Prominent among these is a concern that, if attrition 
is concentrated at particular types of schools, then certain types of students may systematically 
receive a lower quality education than other students. On one hand, suppose that teachers receive less 
enjoyment in minority schools for reasons unrelated to teaching effectiveness.  In this case, teachers 
of all quality will want to leave these schools and it will likely be the better teachers who will be able 
to find new principals who agree to hire them.  Thus, under the seemingly reasonable assumption that 
minority schools do not get better new hires than other schools, it seems likely that high attrition 
rates at black schools will tend to be indicative of lower quality education in this case.  However, 
conclusions tend to be more ambiguous if some subset of teachers find teaching less enjoyable 
because they are less effective teaching in minority schools and the high attrition rates result from 
these teachers finding better school matches.  In this case, it will be the teachers who are more 
effective in minority schools who will remain and minority schools may only be worse than other 
schools to the extent that it takes the less effective teachers time to leave these schools or to the 
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extent that there are not enough teachers who are effective at teaching in minority schools to fill all 
of the positions at these schools.27 
At first glance, the discussion in the paper might suggest that it is quite plausible to believe 
that some subset of teachers are less effective teaching in black schools; one might think that black 
schools  like  other  high  poverty  schools may be challenging places to teach effectively and teacher 
characteristics such as energy, motivation, and patience, which are presumably valuable in these 
types of schools, may be possessed by only a subset of teachers.  However, if race per se does not 
make a particular student more difficult to teach, our empirical finding that high attrition rates do not 
appear in high poverty, low test score, non-minority schools casts a serious doubt on the plausibility 
of believing that the force driving mobility in minority schools is differences in teaching 
effectiveness generated by general characteristics such as motivation, energy, and patience.  In 
particular, it would have to be the case that (1) the TEST and POVERTY variables do not fully 
measure the factors that determine how challenging it is to teach effectively in a particular school and 
(2) the portion not captured by these variables is both spuriously being attributed to the PBLACK 
variable in our empirical work and happens to be the portion that requires general teacher attributes 
such as energy, motivation, and patience.  If these conditions are not satisfied, one needs 
explanations in which some subset of teachers are more effective teaching black students for reasons 
directly  related  to race.  One obvious possibility is that black teachers are more effective at teaching 
black students than non-black teachers.28  However, as discussed in detail earlier in this section, 
                                                 
27For simplicity, this discussion focuses on teachers who are changing schools.  At an intuitive level, one might 
think that teachers who leave first teaching jobs for other teaching jobs may be of higher quality than those who 
leave first teaching jobs for other exit activities such as taking care of young children.  One reason that one might 
expect this is that, in order to change teaching jobs, one typically has to find a principal who is willing to accept the 
teacher while this type of review is not needed to leave the workforce altogether. In this case, knowing whether or 
not the high rate of exits from minority schools is generated primarily by exits to particular types of activities may 
provide information that is useful for thinking about potential quality implications of turnover at these schools.  Our 
competing risks model finds that the proportion of students that are black has strong relationships to virtually all of 
the exit reasons. 
28There is a large literature focused on how the race and gender of faculty relate to students of different race and 
gender.  Generally, the focus of this research has been on such issues as the attitudes towards and expectations of 
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while this explanation may imply that minority schools tend to replace departing teachers with 
teachers who on average are more effective, it suggests that minority schools will be of lower quality 
if there does not exist enough black teachers to staff all black schools. 
We note that the specifications in the paper undoubtedly suffer from omitted school variables 
that are potentially correlated with our PBLACK variable.  As a result, it is important to note that 
even if attrition is caused by preferences that are unrelated to teaching effectiveness, it is very 
possible that teachers find teaching in black schools to be less enjoyable for reasons unrelated to 
simple racial bias.  However, given that black teachers are not more likely to leave black schools than 
white schools, omitted school variables of relevance must influence white teachers differently than 
black teachers. The type of possibility that would be relevant is that white teachers may tend to live 
further from black schools than black teachers.  
The discussion suggests that future research that provides direct evidence about the 
relationship between teacher turnover and teacher quality would be very valuable. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
students, but not student performance; this research is discussed by Ehrenberg and Brewer (1995). We identified one 
paper that addressed the relationship between the race of a teacher and the performance of students.  Using the 
National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988, Ehrenberg, Goldhaber and Brewer (1995) find that “for the most 
part [the race, gender and ethnicity of the teacher] did not affect how much students learned.” 
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TABLE 1:  SUMMARY STATISTICS - FIRST YEAR OF TEACHING SPELL 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
WAGE 29783 4674 
LOGWAGE - Log(Wage)  10.35 0.155 
TEST - Test score students* 53.28 14.69 
POVERTY - Proportion of students in poverty** 0.464 0.273 
PBLACK - Proportion of black students 0.388 0.319 
MALE - Teacher is male 0.125 0.33 
BLACK - Teacher is black 0. 167  0.373 
BLACK*PBLACK 0.112 0.281 
N= 11,070 
*Student test score equals the average 3rd grade percentile rank on the Iowa Test of 
Basic Skills Exam (ITBS Math + ITBS Reading)/2. 
**POVERTY is the proportion of children in school eligible for free or reduced price 
lunch. 
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TABLE 2:  TEACHER TRANSITIONS 
Transition Category Number of Teachers  Percent of Teachers 
Same School*  4222 38.1% 
New School / Same District 2319 20.9% 
New District 1374 12.4% 
Other Education Sector Job 803 7.3% 
Non-Education Sector job** 343  3.1 % 
Out of GA Workforce  2009 18.1% 
Total 11070 100.0% 
*Teachers who remained at the same school the entire sample period. 
**Former teachers who earned less than $10,000 in a non-education sector job were 
classified as out of the GA workforce. 
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TABLE 3:  SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS IN PRIOR YEAR BY TRANSITION CATEGORY
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Same 
School 
(2) 
New School/ 
Same 
District 
 
(3) 
New  
District 
 
(4) 
Other Educ 
Sector Job 
 
(5) 
Non-Educ 
Sector Job 
 
(6) 
Out of GA 
Workforce 
(7) 
Exit for  
Any Reason 
(2)-(6) 
WAGE  31711 31595 31,422*  30,617***  31704 31833 31,549*** 
TEST 54.47  53.25*** 51 .00***  53.00***  52.47* 54.17 53.01*** 
POVERTY  0.461 0.481**  0.535***  0.501***  0.436  0.458 .485*** 
PBLACK  0.372 0.393**  0.466*** 0.397*  0.427***  0.406*** .414*** 
***statistically significant from mean in column (1) at p<.001. 
**statistically significant from mean in column (1) at p<.01. 
*statistically significant from mean in column (1) at p<.05. 
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TABLE 4:  LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL OF TEACHER TRANSITIONS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat 
Log Teaching Wage -0.058 0.022 -2.65 
*1 0.402 0.052  7.69 
*2 0.374 0.053  6.97 
*3 0.389 0.054  7.09 
*4 0.403 0.056  7.14 
*5 0.395 0.058  6.77 
*6 0.427 0.062  6.89 
MALE 0.007 0.008  0.83 
BLACK Teacher 0.031 0.016  1.89 
TEST Score Students -0.0003 0.0002 -1.62 
POVERTY Students -0.038 0.016 -2.34 
PBLACK Students 0.188 0.015 12.47 
BLACK x PBLACK -0.209 0.024 -8.60 
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TABLE 5:  COMPETING RISKS MODEL OF TEACHER TRANSITIONS 
Risk Variable Coefficient  Std. Error  T-Stat 
New School/Same District   
 Log Teaching Wage -0.274 0.172 -1.60 
 *1 -1.383 0.411 -3.37 
 *2 -1.485 0.422 -3.52 
 *3 -1.468 0.432 -3.40 
 *4 -1.29 0.444 -2.90 
 *5 -1.217 0.458 -2.66 
 *6 -1.143 0.484 -2.36 
 MALE 0.116 0.066  1.75 
 BLACK Teacher 0.124 0.134  0.92 
 TEST Score Students 0.003 0.002 -1.51 
 POVERTY Students 0.057 0.131  0.43 
 PBLACK Students 0.373 0.118  3.15 
 BLACK x PBLACK -0.611 0.196 -3.12 
New District     
 Log Teaching Wage -0.361 0.219 -1.65 
 *1 -2.105 0.524 -4.02 
 *2 -2.034 0.538 -3.78 
 *3 -1.874 0.549 -3.41 
 *4 -2.103 0.566 -3.71 
 *5 -2.031 0.586 -3.47 
 *6 -1.856 0.62 -3.00 
 MALE 0.0004 0.09 0.005 
 BLACK Teacher 0.661 0.172  3.85 
 TEST Score Students -0.005 0.002 -1.81 
 POVERTY Students 0.212 0.166  1.27 
 PBLACK Students 1.325 0.142  9.31 
 BLACK x PBLACK -2.122 0.255 -8.32 
Other Education Sector Job      
 Log Teaching Wage -1.322 0.29 -4.56 
 *1 -0.177 0.685 -0.26 
 *2  -0.79 0.706 -1.12 
 *3 -0.842 0.724 -1.16 
 *4 -0.523 0.744 -0.70 
 *5 -0.32 0.768 -0.42 
 *6 0.241 0.799  0.30 
Table 5 continues next page…
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED):  COMPETING RISKS MODEL OF TEACHER TRANSITIONS 
Risk Variable Coefficient  Std. Error  T-Stat 
Other Education Sector Job 
(continued) MALE 0.099 0.111  0.89 
 BLACK Teacher -0.112 0.232 -0.48 
 TEST Score Students 0.002 0.003  0.56 
 POVERTY Students 0.481 0.217  2.21 
 PBLACK Students 0.148 0.197  0.75 
 BLACK x PBLACK -0.004 0.33 -0.01 
Non-Education Sector Job      
 Log Teaching Wage -0.238 0.43 -0.55 
 *1 -2.573 1.023 -2.52 
 *2 -2.908 1.053 -2.76 
 *3 -2.518 1.074 -2.35 
 *4 -2.662 1.107 -2.40 
 *5 -3.504 1.186 -2.96 
 *6 -4.245 1.516 -2.80 
 MALE 0.553 0.138  4.02 
 BLACK Teacher 0.321 0.327  0.98 
 TEST Score Students -0.011 0.004 -2.57 
 POVERTY Students -1.882 0.326 -5.78 
 PBLACK Students 1.832 0.282  6.49 
 BLACK x PBLACK -1.238 0.472 -2.62 
Out of GA Workforce     
 Log Teaching Wage 0.124 0.184  0.67 
 *1 -2.542 0.442 -5.75 
 *2 -2.658 0.454 -5.86 
 *3 -2.592 0.464 -5.59 
 *4 -2.467 0.476 -5.18 
 *5 -2.751 0.495 -5.55 
 *6 -2.611 0.526 -4.96 
 MALE -0.188 0.078 -2.42 
 BLACK Teacher -0.056 0.159 -0.36 
 TEST Score Students 0.001 0.002  0.41 
 POVERTY Students -0.719 0.142 -5.06 
 PBLACK Students 1.318 0.123 10.72 
 BLACK x PBLACK -1.173 0.228 -5.14 
N=11,070 
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TABLE 6:  EFFECT OF WAGES AND SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS ON LEAVING CURRENT SCHOOL 
Probability of Leaving Current School 
Baseline** WAGE TEST POVERTY  PBLACK 
29.74%  28.86% 29.22%  28.91% 36.25% 
*Table shows the probability of leaving first teaching job after the first year for any reason.  The first column shows the 
probability for a baseline person.  The 2nd-5th columns show probabilities when WAGE, TEST, POVERTY, and 
PBLACK are increased by one standard deviation respectively. 
** Baseline probabilities are computed from the estimates of the competing risks model 
for a non-black female teacher with all other variables set to their sample means. 
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TABLE 7:  CHANGES IN WAGES AND SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS OF MOVERS
 
 
(1) 
New School/ 
Same District 
 
(2) 
New District 
WAGE 2.134 1916 
TEST* 3.37 7.98 
POVERTY -0.054 -0.117 
PBLACK -0.039 -0.133 
 
 
 
